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LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER§ 1415 OF THE EDUCATION FOR ALL
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT OF 1975
INTRODUCTION
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (the
"EAHCA" or the "Act")' was designed to fulfill the unmet educational
needs of handicapped children in order to help them become indepen-
dent, productive citizens.2 The EAHCA provides federal assistance to
states3 that guarantee the right to a free, appropriate, public education to
all handicapped4 children through state statutory schemes that meet the
minimum requirements set forth in the Act.5 Section 1415(e)(2) of the
EAHCA permits the parents or guardians6 of handicapped children to
file a civil action7 in state or federal court for any complaint relating to
their child's educational placement.' Like many federal statutes,9 how-
l. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-
1485 (West 1978 & Supp. 1988)). Congress enacted the EAHCA in 1975 to amend part
B of the Education of the Handicapped Act, created in 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat.
121 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1485) (West 1978 & Supp. 1988)),
which authorized federal grants to the states for the education of handicapped children.
The short title to the entire Act, after amendment, still reads "Education of the Handi-
capped Act" ("EHA"), see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (1982), but courts interchangeably refer
to the statute as EHA and EAHCA. This Note focuses on § 1415(e)(2), which was cre-
ated by the EAHCA. Therefore this Note refers to the entire Act as the EAHCA.
2. See 121 Cong. Rec. 37,416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams, then Chairman of
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and principal author of the Act).
3. See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-13 (West 1978 & Supp. 1988). The EAHCA provision
that states may receive federal funding also applies to the District of Columbia and Pu-
erto Rico. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(6), 1411(a)(2) (1982). All 50 states, as well as the
District of Columbia, currently receive federal funds pursuant to the EAHCA. See
Honig v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592, 597 n.1 (1988) (citing U.S. Dep't of Educ., Ninth Annual
Report to Congress on Implementation of Education of the Handicapped Act (1987)).
4. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(15), (16) (1982) (defining handicapped and special educa-
tion for purposes of the Act).
5. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1) (West 1978 & Supp. 1988); see also infra notes 18-31
and accompanying text (setting forth statutory scheme). The statute provides that the
Secretary of Education determines state eligibility. A state will not receive federal assist-
ance when the Secretary determines that the state has failed to comply with EAHCA
requirements. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(c) (West 1978 & Supp. 1988).
6. The term "parents" as used in this Note refers to parents and legal guardians.
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982). Section 1415(e)(2) provides in relevant part:
"Any party.., shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint
presented .... which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction
or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy."
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982).
8. Parents are entitled to bring complaints "with respect to any matter relating to
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a
free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(E) (1982). This
Note specifically refers to educational placement disputes but also encompasses all ac-
tions permitted under § 1415(b)(1)(E) except reimbursement actions. See infra note 61
and accompanying text.
9. See, eg., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); Labor
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
ever, the EAHCA does not provide an express limitations period in
which to bring an action under the Act in federal court.' 0
When a federal statute creates a cause of action without supplying a
limitations period, federal courts generally borrow a limitations period
from an analogous state statute,11 unless the state period would under-
mine the policies behind the federal statute. 2 The federal courts of ap-
peals that have addressed this issue in the context of EAHCA actions
disagree on the appropriate limitations period governing actions brought
under the Act. 3 This disagreement stems from inconsistent application
of the traditional borrowing procedures for determining the appropriate
statute of limitations. 4 As a result, the limitations periods borrowed
from state statutes for EAHCA claims range from thirty days to three
years. 15
This Note examines the confusion surrounding the limitations period
governing EAHCA actions and argues that the underlying policies of the
Act will be served best either by uniform characterization of EAHCA
claims or by legislative action specifying a limitations period of at least
one year for such claims. Part I of this Note discusses the statutory pro-
visions of the EAHCA and its procedural safeguards designed to protect
the rights of handicapped children and their parents. Part II discusses
Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1982);
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(f) (1982).
10. See Schimmel ex reL Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 480 (4th Cir. 1987);
Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1983); see also
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Nor does the
legislative history evince any specific consideration of a time period for filing a civil action
under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)."), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
11. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2762
(1987); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 & n.12 (1983).
12. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-67; infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 483 (4th Cir. 1987)
(one-year statute of limitations); Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 489
(6th Cir. 1986) (three-year limitation); Adler ex rel. Adler v. Education Dep't, 760 F.2d
454, 460 (2d Cir. 1985) (four-month limitation); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 438 (5th
Cir. 1984) (two-year limitation); Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154,
1157 (9th Cir. 1983) (30-day limitation); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.
2d 443, 454 (3d Cir. 1981) (two-year limitation), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982);
Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1085 (D. Neb. 1980) (court did not decide
between a three-year or four-year limitations period), modified on other grounds, 645 F.2d
592 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
266 (1985) ("'Few areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied
rules than does the subject of periods of limitations.'" (quoting Chardon v. Fumero Soto,
462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))).
15. See Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 1986)
(three-year statute of limitations); Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154,
1157 (9th Cir. 1983) (30-day statute of limitations). A majority of the courts of appeals
that have dealt with this issue seem to favor a limitations period of at least one year. See
supra note 13.
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the steps that federal courts must follow when borrowing state statutes of
limitations. Part II also reviews the types of state statutes from which
federal courts of appeals have borrowed limitations periods and argues
that educational placement disputes brought under section 1415(e)(2) of
the EAHCA should be characterized uniformly as personal injury ac-
tions sounding in tort. Part III examines the goals of the EAHCA, and
argues that a limitations period of at least one year is necessary to further
these aims. This Note concludes that the ideal solution requires legisla-
tive enactment of a one-year limitations period and that courts, in the
interim, should borrow limitations periods applicable to state personal
injury actions.
I. THE EAHCA
A. Statutory Scheme
Immediately prior to enactment of the EAHCA, Congress determined
that many handicapped children were not receiving appropriate educa-
tions due to the insufficiency of funds allocated to special educational
programs by the states.' 6 In response, it passed the EAHCA, which pro-
vides supplemental federal funding to eligible states. 7
To qualify for federal funding under the Act, a state must submit a
plan that satisfies the minimum requirements of the EAHCA.'8 The
16. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1425, 1431-32; 121 Cong. Rec. 19,482, 37,025 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Randolph, then chairman of the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, and Rep. Brademas,
then chairman of the Subcommittee on Select Education).
At the time of enactment, Congress found that there were over 8 million handicapped
children under the age of twenty-one in the United States whose special educational needs
were not being met. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Of these 8 million,
1.75 million handicapped children were not receiving any education at all, and 2.5 million
handicapped children were receiving an inappropriate education. See 121 Cong. Rec.
37,417 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Schweiker, co-sponsor of the EAHCA).
17. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (West 1978 & Supp. 1988). States may use federal funds
only to cover the excess cost of providing education to handicapped children; states must
first spend as much state money on handicapped children as they spend on nonhandicap-
ped children. See 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(c)(2)(B) (1982); 121 Cong. Rec. 37,024 (1975) (state-
ments of Rep. Brademas).
18. See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412-13 (West 1978 & Supp. 1988). The Act establishes a
procedural framework that gives states the primary responsibility for determining
whether local or intermediate educational agencies within that state are entitled to federal
funds. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(1) (West 1978 & Supp. 1988); 121 Cong. Rec. 37,413
(1975) (statements of Sen. Williams). To be eligible, each local or intermediate educa-
tional agency must submit to the state an application for funds each fiscal year, providing
assurance that the agency has established programs, policies, and procedural safeguards
in accordance with the provisions of the Act delineating state eligibility requirements.
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414 (West 1978 & Supp. 1988) (local agencies must meet state eligi-
bility requirements set out in §§ 1412, 1413(a)). If the educational programs of a local
educational agency do not meet the Act's requirements, or the local agency is entitled to
less than $7,500, the state educational agency may not distribute federal funds to the local
agency. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(c)(4)(A) (1982). Instead, the state agency must provide
education and related services directly to handicapped children living under the province
of that local agency. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1982).
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state plan must establish an order of priority such that federal funds will
be spent to provide education first to handicapped children not receiving
any education and then to the most severely handicapped children who
are receiving an inadequate education. 9 The state plan also must con-
tain a "mainstreaming" provision, requiring that, whenever possible,
handicapped children be placed in educational programs with children
who are not handicapped. 0
To determine the appropriate education for each child, the child's
teacher, a representative of the local educational agency, the parents of
the child, and the child, if possible, participate in formulating an "indi-
vidualized educational program" ("IEP").z' The IEP is a written state-
ment that includes the present educational performance level of the
handicapped child, specific educational services to be provided, the ex-
tent to which mainstreaming the child is possible, the annual educational
goals, and objective criteria for evaluating whether such goals are being
achieved.22 Local or regional educational agencies must review the IEP
annually. 3
The Act contains certain procedural safeguards, which encompass ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings, 24 to ensure due process protection
to handicapped children and their parents.25 School districts must give
parents prior, written notice of any decision to change the child's educa-
tional placement 26 and an opportunity to challenge any matter pertaining
to the child's evaluation and placement.27 In the event that parents and
educational authorities disagree over the appropriate educational place-
ment of a handicapped child, parents are entitled to request an impartial
due process hearing, to be conducted by either the state or local educa-
19. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1982); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320-.324 (1987).
20. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1982).
21. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982).
22. See id.; see also S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1975) ("no single proce-
dure shall be the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for a
child"), reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425, 1453; 121 Cong. Rec.
37,410 (1975) ("Individualized attention to educational needs [is] . . . one of the most
important elements to a child's success in school.") (quoting Sen. Randolph, then chair-
man of the Subcommittee on the Handicapped).
23. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1982) (local agencies may review IEPs more than
once a year "but not less than annually").
24. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)-(e) (1982).
25. See S. Rep. No. 455, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (conference committee report dis-
cussing the procedural safeguards required under the subtitle "Due Process Proce-
dures"), reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425, 1500. The Act entitles
parents of a handicapped child to examine all records relevant to their child's educational
placement and to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1982).
26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1982) ("written prior notice to the parents ... of
the child [is required] whenever [the educational] agency . . . proposes to initiate or
change, or... refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the
child").
27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1982).
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tional agency, in accordance with state law.28 If a local educational
agency conducts the due process hearing, the aggrieved party must have
an opportunity to appeal to the state educational agency.29 Following
appeal, the losing party possesses the right to bring a civil action in fed-
eral district or state court.30 A claimant must exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to initiating a civil action under the EAHCA-unless it
would be futile to do so. 31
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982). Any party to the due process hearings shall be
accorded "the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1)
(1982), "the right to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the at-
tendance of witnesses," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2) (1982), "the right to a written.. . record
of such hearing," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(3) (1982), and "the right to written findings of fact
and decisions." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(4) (1982).
Section 1415(e)(3) of the EAHCA contains a "status quo" provision that guarantees
that the handicapped child will remain in the most recently agreed-upon educational
program during the pendency of any administrative or judicial proceedings. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1982). The status quo provision helps to allay any harm to a child's
education that judicial delay might cause. See Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665
F.2d 443, 453 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
The EAHCA also authorizes private school placement of a handicapped child at public
expense when an appropriate education cannot be provided in public schools. See School
Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985); Kerr
Center Parents Assoc. v. Charles, 842 F.2d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 1988); see also 20
U.S.C.A. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i) (West 1978 & Supp. 1988) ("handicapped children in private
schools and facilities will be provided special education and related services... at no cost
to their parents or guardian, if such children are placed in or referred to such schools or
facilities by the State or... local educational agency"); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401 (1987) (spe-
cifically authorizing private school placements at no cost to parents pursuant to
§ 1413(a)(4)(B)). Parents may be reimbursed for tuitions paid for private special educa-
tion if a court subsequently determines that such placement is proper under the EAHCA.
See School Comm. of Burlington, Mass, 471 U.S. at 369-70 ("Congress meant to include
retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case."). Parents
who, in violation of § 1415(e)(3), unilaterally change their child's placement while pro-
ceedings are pending, do not waive their right to reimbursement. See id. at 372. Such
parents, however, act at their own financial risk, since they will not be reimbursed if the
court ultimately determines that the placement specified in the controverted IEP is the
appropriate one for the child. See id. at 373-74; 34 C.F.R. § 300.403 (1987).
29. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1982).
30. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982) (jurisdiction in federal district court granted
"without regard to the amount in controversy").
31. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 n.17 (1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills
School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 447 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982); S.
Rep. No. 112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1798, 1805; H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1985); see also 121 Cong.
Rec. 37,416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("I want to underscore that exhaustion of
the administrative procedures established under this part should not be required for any
individual complainant filing a judicial action in cases where such exhaustion would be
futile either as a legal or practical matter.").
Parties need not exhaust administrative remedies when:
(1) it would be futile to use the due process procedures (eg., an agency has
failed to provide services specified in the child's individualized educational pro-
gram (IEP) or an agency has abridged a handicapped child's procedural rights
such as the failure to make a child's records available); (2) an agency has
adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary
to the law; (3) it is improbable that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing
1988]
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In 1986, Congress amended the EAHCA to specify that the Act does
not provide the exclusive means through which handicapped children
may pursue an EAHCA, equal protection, or a due process claim to a
publicly financed special education. 32 It passed this amendment in re-
sponse to a Supreme Court decision holding that Congress did not intend
the EAHCA to allow aggrieved parties to resort to other judicial reme-
dies.33 Thus, handicapped children may also seek relief under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ("section 1983") 31 or section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.3' Further, claimants who file suit under
another law that protects the rights of handicapped children must ex-
haust the EAHCA's administrative remedies to the same extent required
administrative remedies (e.g., the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the
relief sought); and (4) an emergency situation exists (e.g., the failure to take
immediate action will adversely affect a child's mental or physical health).
H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985) (Committee on Education and Labor).
32. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f) (West Supp. 1988). Section 1415(f), which was added
as part of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (100 Stat.) 796, provides in relevant part: "Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies
available under the Constitution, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... or other
Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped children and youth . . . ." 20
U.S.C.A. § 1415(f) (West Supp. 1988).
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832
F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987).
Congress enacted § 1415(f) to "re-establish statutory rights repealed by ther [sic] U.S.
Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson." H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1985). The Smith Court held that the EAHCA was the exclusive avenue through which
handicapped children could enforce their rights to a publicly financed special education,
thereby prohibiting handicapped children from bringing such claims under § 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 ("§ 1983"), or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See
Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009, 1012-13. The Court reasoned that the detailed procedural pro-
tections of the Act indicated that Congress intended the EAHCA to be the exclusive
remedy. See id. at 1019. According to Smith:
[T]here is no doubt that the remedies, rights, and procedures Congress set out
in the [EAHCA] are the ones it intended to apply to a handicapped child's
claim to a free appropriate public education .... Congress did not intend a
handicapped child to be able to circumvent the requirements or supplement the
remedies of the [EAHCA] by resort to the general antidiscrimination provision
of § 504.
Id. at 1019.
34. See The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 in rele-
vant part provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
35. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1988). Sec-
tion 504, which is applicable to equal protection claims, provides: "No otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual.., shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
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had the suit been filed under the EAHCA.36
II. BORROWING STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
When a federal statute, such as the EAHCA, does not provide an ex-
press limitations period for claims brought under it, federal courts gener-
ally may assume that Congress expects them to borrow state limitations
periods. 37 When the adoption of a state statute of limitations would frus-
trate the purpose of the federal substantive law, however, the Supreme
Court has advocated adopting the limitations period of an analogous fed-
eral statute.38 Borrowing from an analogous state statute, however, re-
mains the norm.39
In Wilson v. Garcia," an action brought under section 1983, the
Supreme Court provided the analytical framework that federal courts
must use to determine the most analogous state statute from which to
borrow a limitations period.41 Under Wilson, federal courts first must
decide whether all actions under the federal statute in question should be
characterized42 uniformly or whether the characterization should vary
36. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f) (West Supp. 1988); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748,
756 (2d Cir. 1987); S. Rep. No. 112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1798, 1805; H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1985).
37. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2762
(1987); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985); DelCostello v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 & n.12 (1983); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
478, 485 (1980).
38. See e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2764
(1987) (adopting limitations period of Clayton Act to actions for civil RICO); Delos-
tello, 462 U.S. at 154-55 (borrowing limitations period of § 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982), for actions of employees against an employer
and a union); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367-68 (1977) (adopting
federal statute of limitations for EEOC enforcement actions).
That state law does not provide a perfect analogy, however, is never enough to justify
the application of a federal limitations period. The court must be convinced that state
limitations periods would be so inconsistent with the purpose of the federal law as to
make application of a federal limitations period "'significantly more appropriate.'" See
Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2762-63 (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171-72);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270 n.21 (1985) (same).
39. See Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2763 (quoting Delcostello, 462 U.S. at
171).
40. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
41. See id. at 268; see also Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2762 (applying Wilson
analysis to civil RICO action); Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 486
(6th Cir. 1986) (applying Wilson analysis to EAHCA claim).
42. Characterization is the process by which federal courts classify a federal claim in
terms of a state cause of action to determine the most analogous state statute from which
to borrow a limitations period. See, eg., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985)
("adopting the statute governing an analogous cause of action under state law"); Board of
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980) (courts borrow "the state law of limita-
tions governing an analogous cause of action"); Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D.,
695 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). The characterization of federal claims "is
derived from the elements of the cause of action, and Congress' purpose in providing it."
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268; see United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60-61
(1981). The characterization of a federal claim for purposes of determining the appropri-
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with the facts presented in each case.43 Next, courts must determine the
proper characterization of the federal claim and, after having done so,
decide which relevant state statute provides the most appropriate limita-
tions period.44 Federal courts, however, may not borrow a state limita-
tions period that conflicts with the policies underlying the federal
statute.45
A. Uniform Characterization of EAHCA Actions
The Supreme Court in Wilson noted that the lower courts had been
utilizing differing methods of characterization for section 1983 actions
and applying multifarious criteria for evaluating the applicability of state
statutes of limitations to particular claims. 46 The federal courts that
have decided EAHCA actions have had similar problems.47 For exam-
ple, these courts have borrowed limitations periods from several types of
state statutes, including tort statutes,4" administrative appeal statutes,
49
catch-all statutes,5 0 and statutes governing writs of certiorari." Indeed,
the problem at the base of the borrowing conflict is that most federal
courts that have considered EAHCA actions have recognized their obli-
gation to characterize the EAHCA claims, but then have failed to do
so. 52 Instead, these courts simply have adopted state statutes containing
ate limitations period is a matter of federal law; the characterization that a state court
would apply to the federal claim is not determinative. See Agency Holding Corp., 107 S.
Ct. 2759, 2762 (1987); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269-70; UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 706 (1966).
43. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268; see also Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2762
(citing the analysis set forth in Wilson).
44. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.
45. See id. at 266-67 (1985); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226, 240 (1985); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
46. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266.
47. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
48. See Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1984) (adopting two-year limita-
tions period generally applicable to tort claims); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist.,
665 F.2d 443, 454 (3d Cir. 1981) (borrowing a two-year limitations period generally ap-
plicable to an action to recover damages for injuries caused by the wrongful act or negli-
gence of another), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
49. See Adler ex rel. Adler v. Education Dep't, 760 F.2d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1985)
(applying four-month limitations period applicable to administrative appeal statute for
education to reimbursement action); Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d
1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1983) (30-day limitation period borrowed from administrative ap-
peals statute).
50. See Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 480, 483 (4th Cir. 1987)
(borrowing one-year limitation period applicable to personal actions for which no limita-
tions period is otherwise prescribed); Kirchgessner ex rel Kirchgessner v. Davis, 632 F.
Supp. 616, 622 (W.D. Va. 1986) (adopting one-year limitations period for actions other
than personal injury where no limitation is otherwise prescribed).
51. See Thomas v. Staats, 633 F. Supp. 797, 803-06 (S.D.W. Va. 1985) (adopting
four-month statute of limitations applicable to writs of certiorari).
52. See, e.g., Schimmel, 819 F.2d at 480-81, 483; Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 436-
38 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 448, 454-55 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982); see also Kirchgessner ex reL Kirchgessner
v. Davis, 632 F. Supp. 616, 619, 622 (W.D. Va. 1986) (court characterized one statute but
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a limitations period that each court deemed appropriate, without ensur-
ing that the state cause of action was itself analogous to the EAHCA
action.53
In Wilson, the Court concluded that one broad characterization cover-
ing all section 1983 claims is most appropriate.54 The Court recognized
that section 1983 encompasses many topics and subtopics." If the
choice of t~he limitations period were to depend upon the facts in each
action, counsel legitimately could argue that more than one limitations
period should apply to each section 1983 claim.56 Thus, the Court held,
a uniform characterization of section 1983 actions avoids uncertainty for
litigants and promotes judicial economy."
The same policy concerns that support uniform characterization of
section 1983 claims58 are relevant to section 1415(e)(2) actions. Charac-
terizing all EAHCA placement actions uniformly will avoid uncertainty
for litigants who, because of the inconsistent results reached by the
courts, have little guidance as to which statute of limitations applies.5 9
Uniform characterization also will promote judicial economy by prevent-
ing the "'time-consuming litigation'" required to determine the proper
characterization of EAHCA claims." Therefore, courts should charac-
terize EAHCA actions uniformly, rather than continuing to attempt
case-by-case characterizations.6"
did not characterize state statute ultimately adopted). But see Department of Educ.,
Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1983) (court characterized action as
administrative appeal and ultimately borrowed administrative appeal statute of
limitations).
53. See, e.g., Schimmel, 819 F.2d at 483; Scokin, 723 F.2d at 437-38; Tokarcik, 665
F.2d at 454-55; Kirchgessner, 632 F. Supp. at 622; see also Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F.
Supp. 1074, 1085 (D. Neb. 1980) (court did not apply any limitations period), modified
on other grounds, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983).
54. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985).
55. See id. at 273 (for example, discrimination in public employment on the basis of
race; discharge without procedural due process; mistreatment of schoolchildren; deliber-
ate indifference to medical needs of prison inmates).
56. See id. at 273-74.
57. See id at 275 & n.34; see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
107 S. Ct. 2759, 2764 (1987) (extending Wilson's reasoning to impose a uniform statute of
limitations for civil RICO claims by borrowing a limitations period from federal law).
58. See supra text accompanying note 57.
59. Cf Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2764 (" 'Plaintiffs may be denied their just
remedy if they delay in filing their claims, having wrongly postulated that the courts
would apply a longer statute.'" (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 n.34
(1985))). This concern is especially acute in the context of EAHCA actions; handicapped
children may be harmed irreparably if they are barred from enforcing their right to an
appropriate education.
60. Cf Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2764 ("a uniform statute of limitations is
required to avoid intolerable 'uncertainty and time-consuming litigation.'" (quoting W/l-
son, 471 U.S. at 272)).
61. In Janzen v. Knox County Board of Education, 790 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1986), a
reimbursement action brought under § 1415(e)(2) of the EAHCA, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit found that the Wilson rationale did not apply to EAHCA actions.
See Janzen, 790 F.2d at 487. Examination of the Janzen decision, however, demonstrates
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B. Characterization of EAHCA Actions
According to the Wilson format, once a court concludes that all claims
brought pursuant to a federal statute should be characterized uniformly,
the court then must determine the proper characterization and adopt the
limitations period applicable to the most analogous state statute.62
Although the Wilson Court did not establish guidelines for determining
the most analogous state statute once the federal claim has been charac-
terized, federal courts that have reviewed EAHCA actions have required
that the state statute be procedurally analogous to the Act.63
These courts rely on the scope of judicial review as the primary factor
to determine whether state statutes procedurally are analogous to the
EAHCA. 6 Because a state limitations period must not undermine fed-
eral policies, 65 where the scope of judicial review under a state statute is
more restrictive than the scope of review under the Act, federal courts
have refused to borrow the limitations period applicable to the state stat-
that the court misinterpreted the Wilson inquiry. The Janzen court stated that Wilson
directed federal courts first to determine whether the same limitations period should ap-
ply to all actions under the federal act or whether the limitations period should vary
depending on the facts of the case. See id. at 486. The proper inquiry, however, asks
whether all claims under a federal act should be characterized uniformly or on a case-by-
case basis. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). The Wilson Court focused on
the characterization of the action; only after a federal action is characterized should a
federal court determine the most relevant state statute of limitations. See id. at 268.
The Janzen court also stated that each EAHCA case must be characterized individu-
ally. See Janzen, 790 F.2d at 487. As support, the court distinguished reimbursement
actions from placement disputes, see id., noting that these two actions warrant different
limitations periods because they raise distinct issues. This conclusion in no way conflicts
with the argument of this Note, which advocates uniform characterization of educational
placement disputes brought under § 1415(e)(2) of the EAHCA. Reimbursement claims
are brought to recover money spent on education after the resolution of any placement
dispute between parents of handicapped children and school authorities. Thus, reim-
bursement actions brought under § 1415(e)(2) are distinguishable, and should be charac-
terized differently, from other § 1415(e)(2) actions.
62. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268; supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
63. See Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 1987);
Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1983); Tokarcik v.
Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121
(1982); Kirchgessner ex rel. Kirchgessner v. Davis, 632 F. Supp. 616, 619 (W.D. Va.
1986); Max M. v. Thompson, 566 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Procedural differences often indicate "that the policy considerations relevant to setting
the limitation period for the state suit [have] no necessary application to the federal cause
of action." Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
64. See Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 1987);
Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1983); Tokarcik v.
Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121
(1982); Kirchgessner ex rel. Kirchgessner v. Davis, 632 F. Supp. 616, 620 (W.D. Va.
1986); Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1084-85 (D. Neb. 1980), modified on
other grounds, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983). But see
Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1984) (procedural differences irrelevant
where court rejected limitations period applicable to state statute as inconsistent with
purposes of the Act).
65. See cases cited supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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ute.6 6 Section 1415(e)(2) provides that the court in the civil action must
review the administrative determinations and any new evidence intro-
duced by either party.67 In addition, the court's decision must be
founded upon a preponderance of the evidence.68
The Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley,69
held that section 1415(e)(2) requires courts to accord a degree of defer-
ence to state administrative determinations.7" The federal courts of ap-
peals, however, disagree with regard to the "due weight" that federal
courts must give to state administrative proceedings under the
EAHCA.71 Although courts must give some consideration to state ad-
ministrative determinations, logic dictates that Congress, by allowing the
introduction of new evidence and granting the court broad remedial pow-
ers, intended the courts to conduct an independent review. 2
66. See Schimmel ex reL Schimmel v. Spilane, 819 F.2d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 1987);
Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1983); Tokarcik v.
Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121
(1982); Kirchgessner ex reL Kirchgessner v. Davis, 632 F. Supp. 616, 620 (V.D. Va.
1986); Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1084-85 (D. Neb. 1980), modified on
other grounds, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983).
67. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982). Section 1415(e)(2) provides that: "the court
shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence
at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,
shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate."
68. See id.
69. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
70. See id at 206. The Rowley court reasoned that allowing federal courts to set aside
the findings of state proceedings would frustrate Congress' intention to give state and
local educational agencies, in cooperation with the parents of a handicapped child, the
primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded. See id. at 206-07.
71. Compare Karl v. Board of Educ., 736 F.2d 873, 877 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We believe
Rowley requires that federal courts defer to the final decision of the state authorities, and
that deference may not be eschewed merely because a decision is not unanimous or the
reviewing authority disagrees with the hearing officer.") with Roncker ex rel. Roncker v.
Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.) ("the standard of review as set out in Rowley
requires a de novo review but ... the district court should give due weight to the state
administrative proceedings in reaching its decision"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983)
with School Bd. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir. 1985) ("While the Supreme
Court in Rowley made it clear that due weight should be given to the results of the state
administrative proceedings, the Court recognized that Congress intended the courts to
make 'independent decision[s] based on a preponderance of the evidence.'" (quoting
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982) (quoting S. Conf. Rep. No. 455, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425,
1503))).
72. Rowley serves to caution courts that they cannot simply disregard the state ad-
ministrative determination in reaching their independent decisions. See supra note 71.
The state determination should be treated as a piece of evidence that, along with other
new evidence, the district court must consider to reach a decision by a preponderance of
the evidence. See Karl ex reL Karl v. Board of Educ., 736 F.2d 873, 878-79 (2d Cir.
1984) (Pratt, J., dissenting). Judge Pratt, in his dissent to Karl, stated that:
[Congress commanded the courts to conduct de novo hearings .... Rowley's
"gloss" on a clearly written statute requires only that the district judge give
"due weight" to the views of the administrators; when those views conflict, it
does not require him to accept the conclusion of the state's commissioner of
19881
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1. Personal Injury Claims
An examination of the various state statutes from which courts have
borrowed limitations periods v3 demonstrates that EAHCA claims are
most appropriately characterized as personal injury actions. Further,
such characterization provides a sufficient procedural analogy to the
EAHCA.
The Supreme Court in Wilson 74 held that section 1983 claims are most
appropriately characterized as personal injury actions. 5 Congress en-
acted section 1983 to enforce the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution,76 which ensures the equal protection of the law to all
people." The Wilson Court concluded that a violation of the fourteenth
amendment constitutes an injury to personal rights." Thus, the relief
sought under section 1983 compensates for a violation of one's individual
rights.7 9
education, nor does it relieve him of the burden of making the de novo determi-
nation required by congress [sic].
Id. at 878-79 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
73. One federal court, as a result of its failure to characterize the § 1415(e)(2) action
before it, borrowed the limitations period from a state statute that prescribes a limitations
period for all actions not governed by a statute of limitations ("catch-all statutes"). See
Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 483 (4th Cir. 1987). The Supreme
Court has rejected the application of catch-all limitations periods for statutory claims to
§ 1983 and RICO actions because not all states have a catch-all statute of limitations.
See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2765 (1987); Wil-
son v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985). In Wilson, the Court also determined that Con-
gress would not have intended catch-all statutes of limitations to apply to § 1983 actions
because of the scarcity of statutory claims that existed when § 1983 was enacted in 1871.
See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 278. In Agency Holding Corp., the Supreme Court rejected the
borrowing of catch-all statutes of limitations for civil RICO actions, citing to Wilson
without further elaboration. See Agency Holding Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 2765. As the Wil-
son rationale is inapplicable to RICO, which was enacted in 1970, the logical interpreta-
tion is that the Agency Holding Corp. Court concluded that Congress did not intend state
catch-all statutes of limitations to be applied to any federal cause of action. Thus, catch-
all statutes of limitations cannot be borrowed for EAHCA actions.
One federal district court applied the statute of limitations from a state statute gov-
erning writs of certiorari. See Thomas v. Staats, 633 F. Supp. 797, 803-06 (S.D.W. Va.
1985). Such a statute, however, provides an inappropriate analogy to EAHCA claims
because the writ of certiorari is discretionary, see id. at 804, while the right to bring an
EAHCA claim is guaranteed under § 1415(e)(2) to any party who has exhausted state
administrative remedies, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982); supra notes 30-31 and accom-
panying text. Further, the writ of certiorari is an application for appeal, see Thomas, 633
F. Supp. at 804-05, whereas actions brought pursuant to § 1415(e)(2) of the EAHCA are
separate civil actions that may be brought in federal district court, see infra notes 96-106
and accompanying text (appeals statutes inappropriate for characterization purposes).
74. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
75. See id. at 280.
76. See id. at 277 ("[t]he unifying theme of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is reflected in
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment").
77. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 277-78.
79. See id. at 271-72; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972) (@ 1983 provides a
"remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured
by the Constitution and laws of the Nation").
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EAHCA actions also should be characterized as personal injury ac-
tions sounding in tort. The Act's legislative history establishes that, like
section 1983, Congress enacted the EAHCA pursuant to the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment to ensure equal protection of the
laws"0 and to provide equal educational opportunity to all handicapped
children."1 The right of handicapped children to an appropriate educa-
tion under the EAHCA is a right guaranteed by the federal govern-
ment.8 2 Where an educational placement claim is brought under section
1415(e)(2), the nature of the claim is that a child's individual educational
rights have been violated because the child has not been placed in an
educational program, or has been placed inappropriately. s3 Thus, sec-
tion 1415(e)(2) claims and those brought under section 1983 overlap sig-
nificantly." Further, by amending the Act in 1986 to include a
nonexclusivity provision, 5 Congress evidenced its intention to allow par-
ents of handicapped children to bring actions under section 1983, as well
as EAHCA section 1415(e)(2), to enforce the educational rights of their
children.86
Further, as the Wilson court noted, it is highly unlikely that the limita-
tions periods applicable to general personal injury statutes would ever
discriminate against federal actions or conflict with federal law8" so as to
preclude their application. 8 In addition, state personal injury statutes
procedurally are analogous to the EAHCA. Personal injury actions
80. See 121 Cong. Rec. 19,485, 19,492, 37,417 (1975) (statements of Sen. Williams
and Sen. Schweiker); see also S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1975) ("The
Committee [on Labor and Public Welfare] recognizes... the Congress' own responsibil-
ity under the 14th Amendment to assure equal protection of the law."); Kerr Center
Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 581 F. Supp. 166, 168 (D. Or. 1983) (EAHCA enacted pursu-
ant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment), rev'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir.
1988).
81. See 121 Cong. Rec. 19,485, 19,492, 37,023, 37,030, 37,413 (1975). Senator Wil-
liams, the principal author of the EAHCA, stated:
The Constitution provides that all people shall be treated equally, but we know
that, while all youngsters have an equal right to education, those who live with
handicaps have not been accorded this right. [The EAHCA] fulfills the promise
of the Constitution that there shall be equality of education for all people, and
that handicapped children no longer will be left out.
Id. at 37,413.
82. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982).
83. See, eg., Schimmel ex rel Schimmel, 819 F.2d 477, 479 (4th Cir. 1987) (parents
allege improper placement); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1984) (same);
Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
84. Cf Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1985) (court ap-
plied Wilson Court's personal injury characterization of § 1983 claims to § 1981 claims
because of overlap of § 1983 and § 1981 claims), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987).
85. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f) (West Supp. 1988); see supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text.
86. See H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) ("[S]ince 1978 it has been
Congress' intent to permit parents or guardians to pursue the rights of handicapped chil-
dren through ... section 1983."); supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
87. 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985).
88. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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brought in state courts are ordinary civil actions in which the court
makes its determination based upon a preponderance of the evidence 89-
the same burden of proof required by section 1415(e)(2). 90 In addition,
as in a personal injury action, courts reviewing EAHCA claims may hear
any additional evidence offered by the parties in reaching its decision.91
Thus, the rules applicable to personal injury actions are at least as broad
as those governing the EAHCA, given the "due weight"92 that federal
courts must give to state administrative determinations.
2. Administrative Appeal Statutes
Some federal courts, however, improperly have characterized EAHCA
actions as administrative appeals and have borrowed the limitations pe-
riod applicable to state administrative appeal statutes. 93 Because a claim-
ant must exhaust state administrative remedies as a condition precedent
to bringing a civil action for an EAHCA violation,94 these courts argue
that section 1415(e)(2) actions essentially are appeals from administrative
proceedings.95 Section 1415(e)(2), however, permits a separate civil ac-
tion to be brought by an aggrieved party; it says nothing with respect to
appeals from state proceedings. 96 Indeed, the version of the EAHCA
originally passed by the House of Representatives provided for appeals to
be taken from state educational agency determinations, but the confer-
ence committee rejected this language 97 and created instead a right to
bring a civil action-the language ultimately adopted by Congress.98
Thus, characterizing section 1415(e)(2) claims as state administrative ap-
peals is inappropriate because administrative appeal statutes are designed
specifically to govern appeals from state administrative agencies to state
courts9 9 and are not intended to apply to distinct civil actions brought in
federal court. "
89. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 339, at 956
(C. Cleary ed. 1984 & 1987 pocket part); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498, at 419 (J.
Chadbourne rev. 1981).
90. See supra note 67.
91. See supra note 67.
92. See supra notes 70-72.
93. See Adler ex rel. Adler v. Education Dep't, 760 F.2d 454, 459-60 (2d Cir. 1985);
Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1983).
94. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
95. See Adler, 760 F.2d at 457; Carl D., 695 F.2d at 1157.
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
97. See S. Rep. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, 50, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1480, 1501, 1503; 121 Cong. Rec. 36,635-36 (1975); Tokarcik v.
Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121
(1982).
98. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982).
99. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-183 (West Supp. 1988) (authorizes appeals
from state agencies to state superior court); Idaho Code § 67-5215 (Supp. 1987) (autho-
rizes appeals from state agencies to state court); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, § 321 (West
1987) (authorizes appeals from state agencies to state court).
100. See Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 449-50 (3d Cir. 1981)
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Further, courts should reject administrative appeal statutes because
they are not procedurally analogous to civil actions brought under the
Act."°1 The scope of judicial review and the remedial powers ordinarily
conferred on courts that review administrative appeals are more restric-
tive than those granted by the EAHCA.'02 Section 1415(e)(2) allows a
court in the civil action to grant whatever relief it deems appropriate103
In addition, the bill originally passed by the House of Representatives
contained a provision stating that the court must adopt state agency de-
terminations if the administrative determination was supported by sub-
stantial evidencel'-the deferential standard ordinarily applied to
review of administrative law." 5 Prior to passage, however, the confer-
ence committee changed this provision to the current statutory standard
applied in civil actions requiring proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. 10 6
III. ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: CONSISTENT WITH
FEDERAL POLICIES
Once a federal court has characterized the federal claim and found a
procedurally analogous state statute, the court then must decide whether
the limitations period from that state statute is consistent with the poli-
(citing to Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1085 (1980)), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1121 (1982); Max M. v. Thompson, 566 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (N.D. I1. 1983) (same);
Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1085 (D. Neb. 1980), modified on other
grounds, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983). In Monahan,
the district court stated:
State statute[s] of limitations designed to govern judicial proceedings in which
the court merely reviews the administrative record to determine if the agency
decision is supported by substantial evidence should not be applied to federal
proceedings in which the court is empowered to make an independent determi-
nation based on evidence not found in the administrative record.
Monahan, 491 F. Supp. at 1085.
101. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
102. See Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982); see, eg., Ala. Code § 41-22-20(i), (k) (Supp. 1987) (review-
ing court may not hear additional evidence regarding facts determined by the agency, and
agency determination is "prima facie just and reasonable"); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-
183(f), (g) (West Supp. 1988) (appeal confined to record, and court may reverse if "sub-
stantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings
... are... clearly erroneous in view of the... substantial evidence on the whole record);
Idaho Code § 67-5215 (Supp. 1987) (same); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, § 321 (%Vest 1987)
(same).
103. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982).
104. See H.R. Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975).
105. See Erickson Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 1984); Ore-
gon Dep't of Human Resources v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 727 F.2d
1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1983); Home Health Serv. of the United States v. Schweiker, 683
F.2d 353, 356-57 (11th Cir. 1982); MeHenry v. Bond, 668 F.2d 1185, 1190 (1lth Cir.
1982); Henkle v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 811, 812 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1980).
106. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982) (proof by preponderance of the evidence)
with H.R. Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975) (substantial evidence).
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cies underlying the federal act."°7 If the state limitations period is not
consistent, the court may not borrow that statute of limitations. 0 8
A. Goals and Purposes of the EAHCA
The two foremost objectives of the EAHCA are to ensure that each
handicapped child receives an appropriate, publicly funded education10 9
and to prevent erroneous educational placement."10 The design of the
EAHCA's statutory scheme also ensures parental involvement in the ed-
ucational decision-making pertaining to their child, primarily through
their participation in the IEP.1"
Courts considering EAHCA civil actions should borrow a limitations
period of at least one year in duration to promote the federal policies
underlying the EAHCA.I" A limitations period of at least one year fur-
thers the goal of providing education for all handicapped children," 3
by permitting legitimate claims of handicapped children to be brought.
Such a limitations period also ensures that parents are given the op-
portunity to become involved in the education of their handicapped
children." 4 A short limitations period may penalize parents unfair-
107. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982); S. Rep. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, re-
printed in 1975 U.S. Code & Cong. Admin. News 1425, 1482; 121 Cong. Rec. 37,023,
37,025, 37,417 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982); Adler ex rel.
Adler v. Education Dep't, 760 F.2d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1985).
110. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code &
Cong. Admin. News 1425, 1452; 121 Cong. Rec. 37,023, 37,026 (1975); Scokin v. Texas,
723 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443,
452 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
111. See S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 ("individualized planning confer-
ences are a way to provide parent involvement and protection to assure that appropriate
services are provided to a handicapped child."), reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1425, 1436; see also 121 Cong. Rec. 37,026 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Quie,
then ranking minority member of the Education and Labor Committee); Smith v. Robin-
son, 468 U.S. 992, 1011 (1984); Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208-09 (1982);
Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 482 (4th Cir. 1987); Janzen v. Knox
County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 1986); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432,
437 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 452 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982); Thomas v. Staats, 633 F. Supp. 797, 806 (S.D.
W. Va. 1985). For a definition and discussion of IEP, see supra notes 21-23 and accompa-
nying text.
112. Although the federal courts of appeals disagree over the appropriate limitations
period to apply to § 1415(e)(2) claims, a majority favor a limitations period of one year or
more. See supra note 13.
113. See 121 Cong. Rec. 19,492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
114. See Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 482 (4th Cir. 1987);
Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1984). The EAHCA "uses parental concern
as an enforcement mechanism for the Act's provisions. It relies on parents to question
the appropriateness of their child's education program, and to pursue review of that pro-
gram through administrative and judicial channels." Scokin, 723 F.2d at 437; see Honig
v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592, 598 (1988) (throughout the EAHCA, Congress emphasized the
"importance and indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development
of the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness").
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ly;Ii5 parents may decide that further testing of their child is necessary to
evaluate the agency's decision, leaving them with insufficient time to de-
cide whether to bring a civil action. 16 In addition, parents unrepre-
sented by counsel in the administrative hearing may need to obtain
counsel for the civil action. 1 ' Similarly, when parents unrepresented by
counsel in state administrative proceedings are unaware that they are en-
titled to bring a civil action after obtaining an adverse decision, equity
might mandate against the strict enforcement of a short limitations pe-
riod.118 The better solution, however, is to apply longer statutes of limi-
tations rather than to rely on equitable principles to protect the rights of
handicapped children.'19 Because tort statutes governing personal injury
actions generally contain limitations periods of at least one year, 120 they
115. See Schimmel, 819 F.2d at 482; Scokin, 723 F.2d at 437; Tokarcik v. Forest Hills
School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 452 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
116. See Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 1986);
Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1984).
117. See Scokin, 723 F.2d at 437. Parents also may be unaware of the applicable limi-
tations period or even of its significance. The EAHCA imposes a duty on educational
agencies to inform parents of all procedural safeguards available to them under the Act.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(D) (1982). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
"extrapolated from this provision a requirement that educational agencies inform parents
of the applicable limitations period for judicial review." Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v.
Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 482 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 438
(5th Cir. 1984)). It has not been established, however, that the Act "actually imposes
such a duty on educational agencies." Schimmel, 819 F.2d at 482.
118. See Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 1983).
119. See Schimmel, 819 F.2d at 482 (" 'Rather than relying on equitable principles to
relieve uninformed parents ... we will simply apply a longer statute of limitations.'"
(quoting Scokin, 723 F.2d at 438)).
Generally, a longer statute of limitations may create problems for the educational
agencies and the courts, since memories fade and conditions change. With educational
placement dispute claims, however, much of the evidence, such as the IEP, results of
testing, and school report cards, is documented. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982); text
accompanying supra note 22. Further, this Note advocates the adoption of a one-year
statute of limitations to promote the goals of the EAHCA. See infra notes 133-34 and
accompanying text. It is unlikely that these problems will be encountered by the courts
within a mere one-year period.
120. See, eg., Ala. Code § 6-2-38 (Supp. 1987) (two-year statute of limitations); Alaska
Stat. § 09.10.070 (1983) (two-year limitation); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-542 (Supp.
1987) (two-year limitation); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (1987) (three-year limitation);
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340 (West Supp. 1988) (one-year limitation); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-80-102 (1987) (two-year limitation); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 (1983) (three-year
limitation); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8119 (1974) (two-year limitation); D.C. Code § 12-
301 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (three-year limitation); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1988) (four-year limitation); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33 (1982) (two-year limitation);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7 (1985) (two-year limitation); Idaho Code § 5-219 (1979) (two-
year limitation); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, 13-202 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (two-year
limitation); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-1-2-2 (Bums Supp. 1986) (two-year limitation); Iowa
Code Ann. § 614.1 (West Supp. 1988) (two-year limitation); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60.513
(1983) (two-year limitation); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1986) (one-year limitation); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492 (West Supp. 1988) (one-year
limitation); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 752 (1980) (six-year limitation); Md. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-101 (1984) (three-year limitation); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 260,
§ 2A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984) (three-year limitation); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
19881
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comport with the federal policies underlying the EAHCA. 21
Some courts argue that Congress intended the courts to act as an "ex-
ternal check" to guard against possible deficiencies in the educational
administrative system. 122 For the reasons specified above, a limitations
period shorter than one year would inhibit the aggregation of evidence
necessary to commence an orderly review.123 Longer statutes of limita-
tions, such as those governing personal injury actions, allow courts to
fulfill their obligation of ensuring that a state is providing free, appropri-
ate education through the states' due process mechanism,124 since place-
ment errors often become apparent only with the passage of time. 25
Therefore, administrative appeal statutes, which ordinarily are less than
one year in duration, 2 6 undermine the policies of the EAHCA.
Courts that apply administrative appeal statutes argue that short limi-
§ 600.5805(8) (West 1987) (three-year limitation); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.07(1) (West
Supp. 1988) (two-year limitation); Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972) (six-year limita-
tion); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 (1959) (five-year limitation); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204
(1987) (three-year limitation); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (1985) (four-year limitation);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190 (1987) (two-year limitation); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 508:4 (Supp.
1987) (three-year limitation); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987) (two-year limita-
tion); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8 (1978) (three-year limitation); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.
214 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (three-year limitation); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (1983) (three-
year limitation); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16 (Supp. 1987) (six-year limitation); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Anderson Supp. 1987) (two-year limitation); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1988) (two-year limitation); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12.110 (1985)
(two-year limitation); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (two-year
limitation); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14 (1985) (three-year limitation); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-
3-530(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987) (six-year limitation); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 15-2-14 (1984) (three-year limitation); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (1980) (one-year
limitation); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986) (two-year limita-
tion); Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1987) (four-year limitation); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
§ 512 (Supp. 1987) (three-year limitation); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Supp. 1987) (two-
year limitation); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.16.080 (1962) (three-year limitation); W. Va.
Code § 55-2-12 (1981) (two-year limitation); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 893.54 (West 1983) (three-
year limitation); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 (1977) (four-year limitation).
121. Cf Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) ("It is most unlikely that the
period of limitations applicable to [personal injury] claims ever was, or ever would be,
fixed in a way that would discriminate against federal claims, or be inconsistent with
federal law in any respect.").
122. See Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills
School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 451 & n.14 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
123. See Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 482 (4th Cir. 1987);
Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 1986); Scokin, 723 F.2d
at 437; Tokarcik, 665 F.2d at 451.
124. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
125. See Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills
School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 452 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
126. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 41-22-20(d) (Supp. 1987) (30-day limitation); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 4-183(b) (West Supp. 1988) (45-day limitation); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, 3-
103 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (35-day limitation); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 77-613(c) (Supp. 1987)
(30-day limitation); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 30A, § 14(1) (Law. Co-op. 1983) (30-day limi-
tation); Mich. Comp. Laws § 24.304 (West 1981) (60-day limitation); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 84-917(2) (Supp. 1987) (30-day limitation); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Law. Co-op.
1986) (30-day limitation).
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tations periods satisfy the goal of prompt resolution of disputes. 27 These
courts have inferred this goal from a remark regarding prompt dispute
resolution made by Senator Williams, the principal author of the Act. 128
These courts, however, misread Senator Williams' remarks, which refer
to the speed with which administrative hearings and reviews should be
conducted.'29 Further, a short limitations period is unnecessary to facili-
tate prompt resolution of disputes because the parents themselves, moti-
vated by their concern for their child's educational well-being, will seek
prompt resolution of the civil action.' 30
B. Congressional Amendment
Several states have more than one statute governing personal inju-
ries. "' Unless the Supreme Court resolves the uncertainty as to the ap-
127. See Adler ex reL Adler v. Education Dep't, 760 F.2d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1985)
(four-month limitations period); Department of Educ., Haw. v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154,
1157 (9th Cir. 1983) (30-day limitations period).
128. See Adler, 760 F.2d at 460; Carl D., 695 F.2d at 1157.
These courts quote the following part of Senator Williams' statement to the Senate:
I cannot emphasize enough that delay in resolving matters regarding the educa-
tion program of a handicapped child is extremely detrimental to his develop-
ment. The interruption or lack of the required special education and related
services can result in a substantial setback to the child's development. Thus, in
view of the urgent need for prompt resolution of questions involving the educa-
tion of handicapped children it is expected that all hearings and reviews con-
ducted pursuant to these provisions will be commenced and disposed of as
quickly as practicable consistent with fair consideration of the issues involved.
121 Cong. Ree. 37,416 (1975).
129. See 121 Cong. Rec. 37,415-16 (1975). Senator Williams' remark about prompt
resolution occurred in the midst of a discussion on strengthening procedural safeguards.
See id. He did not mention judicial proceedings until later in his speech: "Ninth. The
provisions of existing law with respect to judicial action are clarified and strengthened
...." Id. at 37,416; see also Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 454 n.20
(3d Cir. 1981) ("Significantly, the language in the legislative history addressed to 'long
and tedious administrative appeals' and the need for promptness in resolving matters,
appears in the context of discussions about administrative proceedings."), cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1121 (1982); 121 Cong. Rec. 37,412 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stafford, then rank-
ing minority member of the Subcommittee on the Handicapped) ("[Tlhe placement, or
change of placement should not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious admini-
strative appeals were being exhausted.").
In response to Senator Williams' concern, the Office of Special Education and Rehabil-
itative Services, Department of Education, enacted regulations requiring local educa-
tional agencies to reach a final decision in the due process hearing not later than 45 days
after receipt of a request for a hearing, and requiring State educational agencies to reach a
final decision in a review within 30 days after receipt of request for a review. See 34
C.F.R. § 300.512(a), (b) (1987). That these regulations only deal with administrative
agencies further indicates that Senator Williams' remark was not meant to encompass
civil actions filed pursuant to § 1415(e)(2).
130. See Schimmel ex reL Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 483 (4th Cir. 1987);
Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 1986); Scokin v. Texas,
723 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443,
453 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
131. Some states have one statute that governs personal injuries in general and another
that governs specific intentional torts causing personal injuries. See, e.g., Mont. Code
1988]
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propriate personal injury limitations period, 132 Congress should enact an
amendment mandating a statute of limitations to eliminate the confusion
over the appropriate limitations period applicable to section 1415(e)(2)
actions. A one-year limitations period seems most appropriate. It pro-
vides for timely resolution of disputes while ensuring that parties receive
a fair opportunity to obtain judicial review of state administrative deter-
minations. 33 A one-year limitations period also comports with Con-
gress' intention that no more than one year should lapse without
reconsideration being given to a handicapped child's educational place-
ment, evidenced by the requirement that the IEP be reviewed
annually. 134
CONCLUSION
Ideally, Congress should enact an amendment to the EAHCA specify-
ing a one-year statute of limitations. Until such an amendment is en-
acted, courts should uniformly characterize educational placement
disputes brought under section 1415(e)(2) of the EAHCA as personal
injury actions sounding in tort. The limitations periods of tort statutes
are consistent with and will further the goals of the Act. This interim
solution ensures consistency among EAHCA claims regarding educa-
tional placement disputes and prevents arbitrary borrowing of limitations
periods by the federal courts.
Jennifer S. Charwat
Ann. § 27-2-204(1), (3) (1987); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 214(3), (5) (McKinney Supp.
1988); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530(5), 15-3-550 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987); Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25, 78-12-29 (1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4.16.080, 4.16.100
(1962); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105[a][iv], [v] (1977).
132. The Wilson Court did not address the borrowing problems that arise when a state
has more than one statute of limitations governing personal injury actions. See Wilson,
471 U.S. 261, 286 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court will rule on this
issue in the context of § 1983 actions in the near future. See Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d
45, 47 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218 (1988).
133. See Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 483 (4th Cir. 1987).
134. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1982).
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